V.K.KRISHNA MENON STUDY CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
UNIVERSITY OF KERALA
Two Day National SeminarOn
India’s Foreign Policy: Emerging Trends in the New Century
April 2-3, 2007
Senate Chamber, University of Kerala, ThiruvananthapuramPROGRAMME
2nd APRIL 2007 (Monday)
Inaugural Session [9.45 AM – 11.10 AM]
Welcome : Dr.Shaji Varkey
Presidential Remarks : Dr. M.K.Ramachandran Nair
(Vice- Chancellor, University of Kerala)
Inaugural Address : Prof. Prabhat Patnaik
(Vice- Chairman, Kerala
State Planning Board)
Keynote Address : India’s Foreign Policy: Emerging Trends in the
New Century
Shri. R.Swaminathan IPS (Rtd.)
(Special Secretary, DG (Security), Govt. of India)
Felicitation : Shri. B.S. Rajeev
(Member, Syndicate, University of Kerala)
Vote of Thanks : Dr.G.Gopa Kumar
Tea
Session I [11.20 AM – 1.20 PM]
State, Society and the Foreign Policy Process in India
Chair : Ambassador T.P. Sreenivasan IFS(Rtd.)
1. Dr.P.K.Pokker : Shift in Policy: India and Great Powers:
(Director, State Institute of Modernity to Post-Modernity
Languages, Thiruvananthapuram)
2. Dr.K.M.Seethi : ‘Consensus’ Beneath ‘Contestation’:
(Reader, School of International Civil Society, Foreign Policy and the
Relations, M.G. University, Kottayam) Indian State
3. Dr.A.K.Ramakrishnan : Neoliberalism, Culture and India’s
(Reader, School of International Foreign Policy
Relations, M.G. University, Kottayam)
4. Dr.Biju B.L. : India’s Foreign Policy: The Long Road to
(Lecturer, Govt.College, Madapally, Democratization
Kozhikkode)
Lunch
Session II [2.00 PM – 3.30 PM]
India’s Neighbourhood Policy
Chair : Prof.V.T.Patil
(Former Vice-Chancellor, Central University,
Pondicherry)
1. Prof.Laksiri Fernando : Indo-Lanka Relations in a Globalizing
(University of Colombo, Sri Lanka) World: The Importance of Political
Partnership
2. Dr.Nimmi Kurian : Reading the Tea Leaves of India-China
(Associate Professor, Centre for Sub-Regional Visions
Policy Research, New Delhi)
3. Prof.A.K.Pasha : India and Gulf States: Challenges and
(Associate Professor, Centre for Opportunities
West Asia and African Studies, JNU)
4. V.Jayanth : India’s Look East Policy with Specific (Associate Editor, The Hindu, Chennai) Reference to South East Asia
5. Dr.Joseph Antony : The Strategic Shift in Indo-U.S. Foreign (Reader, Dept. of Political Science, Policy: The Chinese Perception
Fatima Matha College, Kollam)
6. Dr.Sajad Ibrahim : Emerging Trends in the Indo-Iranian
(Lecturer, Dept. of Political Science, Relations
University of Kerala)
Tea
Session III [3.40 PM – 5.30 PM]
Nuclearisation and Security in South Asia
Chair : Dr.K.Raman Pillai,
(Former Prof. & Head, Dept. of Political Science,
University of Kerala)
1. Air Marshal Y.R.Rane : Emerging Security Challenges in
(Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Peninsular India
Southern Air Command)
2. Dr.M.J.Vinod : Indo-U.S. Nuclear Deal: Issues and
(Prof. & Head, Dept. of Political Science, Challenges
Bangalore University)
3. Dr. C.R.Soman : India’s Health Security
(Chairman, Health Action by People)
4. Dr.R.Sreekantan Nair : National Security [Global] Networks and
(Lecturer (Sl.Gr.), N.S.S. Hindu College Regional Democratic Setbacks: The
Changanacherry) South Asian Experience
5. Dr.Josekutty C.A. : Realist Orientation in India’s Foreign
(Lecturer in Political Science, Policy: An Analysis of Indo-US Govt.Victoria College, Palakkad) Nuclear Deal
3rd APRIL 2007 (Tuesday)
Session IV [9.30 AM – 11.15 AM]
Globalization and India’s Economic Policy
Chair : K.Subramanian,
(Joint Secretary Rtd., Dept. of Economic Affairs,
Govt. of India)
1. Dr. K.N.Harilal : Globalization and Shifting Contours of
(Member, State Planning Board) India’s Economic Policy
2. Dr. P.L.Beena : Theories of Merger and Acquisition: The
(Research Associate, Centre for Experience of Indian Firms Under
Development Studies) Neoliberal Reforms
3. Dr.Atulan Guha : Import-Intensity and Exports: Indian
(Kerala State Planning Board) Experiences during 1990’s
4. Prof.E.K.G.Nambiar : Globalization and Economic Security in
(Prof. and Head, Kunhali Marakkar South Asia
Centre for West Asian Studies,
University of Calicut)
5. Shri.Gilbert Sebastian : Neoliberal Reforms in India: A Critique
(Researcher, JNU)
6. Shri.Yogesh Anand Pai : Intellectual Property Rights and the (Researcher, School of Legal Studies, Indian Policy Shift
CUSAT, Kochi)
Tea
Session V [11.25 AM – 1.15 PM]
Peace and Conflict Resolution in South Asia
Chair : Prof.B.Vivekanandan,
(Prof. (Rtd.), Centre for American and West
European Studies, JNU)
1. Dr.M.S, John : Conflict Resolution and India’s Foreign
(Prof., School of Gandhian Thought, Policy: from Recalcitrance to
M.G. University, Kottayam) Responsiveness
2. Dr.Dimpi Divakaran : Negotiating Ethnonationalism:
(Lecturer, Govt. College, Malappuram) Implications for India
3. Dr.Sashi Kanth Pandey : Issues in Conflict Resolution in South
(Head, Dept. of Political Science, Asia
Narain College, Shikhohabad, U.P.)
4. Dr.A.Basheer : Normalisation of India – Pak
(Reader, Dept. of Political Science, Relations: Overcoming Inhibitions
University of Kerala)
5. Prof. Santasilan Kadirgamar : Peace and Conflict Resolution in
(Professor (Rtd.), University of Jaffna) Sri Lanka: The Role of India
6. Dr.R.V.G.Menon : India’s Energy Security: The Nuclear (Scientist and Social Activist with KSSP) Option
7. Shri.Anil Kumar P. : India’s Soft Balancing with Great (Lecturer, Institute of Distance Education, Powers: Issues in Focus
University of Kerala)
Lunch
Session VI [2.00 PM – 3.30 PM]
Indian Diaspora and India’s Foreign Policy
Chair : Prof.V.Suryanarayan
(Prof & Head (Rtd.), Centre for South and South
East Asian Studies, University of Madras)
1. Dr.G.Gopa Kumar : Rehabilitation of Gulf Returnees: The (Prof. &Head, Dept. of Political Science, Policy Options
University of Kerala)
2. Dr.A.M.Thomas : Indian Diaspora and India’s Foreign (Reader, School of International Relations Policy
M.G.University, Kottayam)
3. Dr.Ajaya Kumar Sahoo : Globalization and Indian Diaspora: The
(Lecturer, Centre for Diaspora Studies, Emergence of Transnational Network
Central University, Hyderabad) of Indian Diasporic Communities
Tea
Valedictory Session [3.40 PM – 5.00 PM]
Welcome : Dr.J.Prabhash
Presidential Remarks : Ambassador Thomas Abraham
IFS (Rtd)
Rapporteur’s Reports :
Valedictory Address : India and the New Global Order
Prof.Ninan Koshy
(Social Activist and Visiting Fellow, Human
Rights Programme, Harvard Law School)
Vote of Thanks : Dr.A.Basheer
INDIA'S "LOOK EAST" POLICY
WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO SOUTH EAST ASIA
V.JAYANTH
(Senior Associate Editor, THE HINDU, Chennai.)
In South Block, New Delhi, and in the corridors of Singapore's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there is a long-standing joke on India-Singapore relations. It is said that in the early 1970s, when Singapore's father of the nation figure Lee Kuan Yew came to New Delhi and sought Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's involvement and India's help in developing the City State, she turned to her officers and said: "Show me in this map where is Singapore!" But two decades later, it was a different story. When India opened up its economy and adopted a slew of economic reforms, Singapore was among the first States to wake up to it. Under a new leader, Goh Chok Tong, the City State saw a new market and indeed a new partner in India. But Lee Kuan Yew, then Senior Minister, is said to have asked: "What can a frog in the well do for you? They do only politics in India."
But that is not the real story of a strategic partnership that has emerged between the two countries. To late Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao and former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong must go, the credit for providing a very solid foundation to bilateral relations. It was more than a coincidence that Narasimha Rao formulated his now famous 'Look East' foreign and economic policy, and Goh Chok Tong realised the huge potential in the Indian economy that was just opening up. New Delhi's 'Look East' policy began with and has consolidated itself through its equations with Singapore, which proved to be an ideal stepping-stone or platform to reach out to South East Asia as a region.
At Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong's initiative, the Association of South East Asian Nations - or ASEAN - invited India to become a 'Sectoral Dialogue Partner' of ASEAN in 1992. That was only a label to begin a dialogue or engagement with New Delhi. But very little happened in the first two years. It was perhaps Narasimha Rao's 1994 visit to Singapore followed by his frequent visits to ASEAN countries in 1995 that really set the tone for a dialogue. At their annual summit in Bangkok in December 1996, ASEAN decided to upgrade India into a 'Full Dialogue Partner.' That was a truly momentous decision and both India and ASEAN have not looked back since.
When Narasimha Rao and his Congress party lost the 1996 general election, Singapore and its political leadership was at a loss. Most of the City State's leaders looked at the Indian electorate as having "betrayed a visionary leader." But they prepared themselves to deal with a changed leadership in New Delhi. Despite the political instability in India over the next two years, I.K. Gujral as the External Affairs Minister, provided some stability to the 'Look East policy,' and carried forward the new relationship. He came over to Jakarta in 1997 to officially participate in ASEAN's annual conference and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) - its security platform. India was formally inducted as a Dialogue Partner and a member of the ARF at that conference. From then on, there has been a major evolution in the India-ASEAN partnership.
Another major step forward was in this century, when India was also invited to attend the ASEAN leaders' summit. What was till then an ASEAN + 3 summit, became an ASEAN + 4 summit, with the inclusion of India - the others being China, Japan and South Korea. Once this was stabilised, the real 'Look East' began to take shape. Again, with Singapore's push, New Delhi was invited to the first East Asian Summit (EAS) last year. The EAS includes, in addition to the ASEAN+4 club, Australia and New Zealand. With its inclusion in the EAS, New Delhi has virtually achieved its integration with East Asia
There is a factor that must have weighed with Singapore and ASEAN in taking forward their relations with India. Basically, and in the initial phase, it was the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. New Delhi, which was till then considered to be in the "Soviet block." Strangely, the break down of the Soviet Union coincided with India's economic liberalisation and things fell into place. But more recently, over the past two years, a blossoming Indo-U.S. relationship has had its impact on India's foreign policy. But it has had a beneficial fall out in South East and East Asia, (excluding China) which basically look to the U.S. for its "security umbrella." Given New Delhi's warm relations with Washington, this region has warmed up even more to India in more ways than one - political, economic and security angles. What India's plans or objectives are remain to be seen.
It is not difficult to understand why India has become important to both ASEAN and East Asia. In 1992, India's trade with the East was just a couple of billion dollars. The prohibitive Customs and tax structure here prevented any meaningful imports because India was till then a "closed economy," striving for self-sufficiency in most sectors and ad hoc imports of essential goods and commodities. First it was trade and then it turned to investments. Singapore, a free trade City State and entrepot port, was the first to feel the differences as its bilateral trade with India started climbing. ASEAN itself, from a mere $ 6 billion trade, is now looking at touching $ 30 billion by 2010. China alone is looking to reach that figure by the same deadline. East Asia alone accounts for just on-seventh India's trade with ASEAN countries. But the growth has increased incrementally over the past three years. Japan and South Korea have emerged among the major foreign investors in India. Simultaneously, India is working to bring down its tariffs to ASEAN levels over the next two or three years.
What is more, India has entered into bilateral Free Trade Agreements with many countries, including Sri Lanka and Singapore among its neighbours. By end-March, it must be able to clinch an FTA with ASEAN as a region - just a few hitches need to be ironed out in that exercise.
The next logical step that India must aspire to take will be to join the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which has frozen its membership for the past decade. There was talk of a "geographical footprint" for APEC's membership, but considering the recent political and economic developments, it should not be difficult to ensure India's participation in the forum that bridges East Asia and Latin America, while including the U.S. as well. Membership of APEC becomes critical to India because it is not part of any formidable or worthwhile trade bloc till now. All its attempts to forge or float some form a trade bloc have failed. After 20 years, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) remains mired in political problems, unable to realise the dream of a South Asian Free Trade Area or SAFTA. The Indian Ocean Region -Association for Regional Cooperation (IOC-ARC) has not taken off in a real sense. Even the limited Bay of Bengal initiative of BIMSTEC, has not gone very far. So, forming part of APEC could provide additional economic clout to India.
In all this, we should basically realise and understand that India's importance and significance as a regional and global player stems from its economic clout. From a closed economy with Hindu Rate of Growth - of 3 to 4 per cent of GDP - the Indian economy has now notched up a 9 per cent growth trajectory. For an economy of one billion plus people to grow at that rate, means a lot to investors and trade. Which country will not want to do business with India, or invest here to catch the burgeoning market? Indians are known for their spending power. Now that 300 to 400 million Indians have fired themselves up with purchasing power, the economy has obviously become a cynosure. It therefore becomes crucial for the Indian economy to push ahead with its reforms and maintain at least an 8 to 9 per cent growth in GDP over the next decade. Only then can India achieve its ambition of becoming a global economic powerhouse.
India can today boast of forging links on all sides - with the U.S. and the European Union in the East, with ASEAN and East Asia in the east, and also with China and Russia, into the Central Asian region. The trade and growth potential has therefore been put on an even keel, without depending too much on any one country or region.
This has been the focus and also the success of India's Look East policy, viewing it more closely with that of South East Asia.
INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE LONG ROAD TO DEMOCRATIZATION(Abstract)
Dr. BIJU. B. L
·Democratization of foreign policy has not been extensively investigated in International Relations, and even the rare attempts in this regard have not produced concrete results because of two reasons – the unquestionable faith of the majority on the myth about the expertise required to formulate foreign policy; and the intellectual factionalism among their opponents while suggesting the modes of democratization.
Endeavours to democratize foreign policy have to focus on both the substance of the policy and the procedure of policy making. A review of India’s foreign policy shows that its substance was more democratic in the initial years of independence even though the procedure of policy formulation was bureaucracy centred and was encircled by the charisma of the political leadership, for instance, Jawaharlal Nehru. The elite-centric idealism, though it was in short of mass base, became a reason to pursue some humanistic ambitions at the international level. But drastic changes in the global and domestic politics caused to the erosion of idealism. At present, both substance-wise and the process-wise the policy is in short of democratic component. The trajectory of independent India’s foreign policy could be described as a transformation from ‘idealistic elitism’ into ‘pragmatic elitism’. Due to the lack of democracy and transparency in the process of policy making and because of the absence of idealistic vision of the political leadership, it has degenerated into the level of intrigue. Yet, it is widely propagated as realist and as destined to preserve the national interest.
Diffusion of liberal democratic ideas and institutions around the world is a defining characteristic of the post-Cold War global order. Accordingly, the policy perspectives of India show better compliance with the dominant players of global politics, mainly the liberal democratic/capitalist countries. Therefore, it has to subscribe to their world view and has to remain as supporter or silent spectator of the onslaught of democracy in the international politics. Democracy is the said objective of American intervention all over the world because the US administration wants to legitimize the financial cost of the military operations among the American public and justify unilateralism among the global community. (Morton H. Halperin, ‘Guaranteeing Democracy’, Foreign Policy, No. 91, Summer, 1993, pp. 105-122). But the US- led intellectual circles, who regard democracy/democratization as the objective of foreign policy fail to grasp (or ignore deliberately) the necessity of democratizing the process and the content of foreign policy.
On the opposite side of this debate, majority of the academics conceptualize democratization in a narrow/formal/procedural sense. Therefore, they are satisfied with assigning regulatory role to the national legislature, especially in ratifying the policy of the executive. Democratization of foreign policy has to be taken beyond this institutional and technical view because the US’ experience proves that legislative control, for instance, the role of the Senate in ratifying the treaties is no bulwark against the undemocratic and unilateral policies of the country. An equal number of people who calls for engagement of civil society groups in foreign policy making disturbingly fail because they could not suggest adequate means to institutionalize it. Equally perturbing is their vacillating stance on critical issues such as the potential of globalization to democratize world politics; mass mobilization and social change; role of ideology and political parties; relevance of class conflicts and contest based on false identities.
Three critical questions would be helpful to analyze the democratic credentials of the foreign policy. 1. How far the foreign policy of India represents the different sections of the domestic population, especially working class, minorities, dalits, indigenous communities, women etc., and what is its reaction to the diverse aspirations of them? 2. How far the foreign policy of India is responsive to the demand of a new world order based on substantive democracy? 3. Whether the failure of Indian state to play a crucial role in restructuring the present world order is related to its class character.
At the outset, it could be stated that among the various government policies the least democratized are defence and foreign policies. Always matters related to them are never disclosed in name of national interest and official secrecy. In defence it causes massive corruption. As far as foreign policy is concerned, lack of transparency and democracy makes it elitist in character. Debates at the grass roots could unravel the mystery behind why the policy, which is supposed to preserve the national interest, is so secret. But the debates in the mainstream, especially among the educated people, are monotonous rather than pluralistic. At the most they are uncritical of the establishment in name of national interest. It seems that India’s foreign policy is based on a consensus between the upper class, urban upper-middle class, higher bureaucracy, top brass of bureaucrat-turned-politicians, military heads and diplomats. Even though the political spectrum of both the centre and the states was pluralized due to the accommodation of the lower caste people into power (middle caste ascendancy) its reflection is not visible in the foreign policy of India. Except the Left no political party could think about a systematic change in the foreign policy so that it could echo the concerns of the under class of India at the international arena.
In times of globalization, India’s rich classes greatly collaborate with those of the capitalist world, which is a reason to deprive the foreign policy of the country a mass character. Therefore, the efforts to foster an international solidarity between the Indian masses and the world poor to fight for their common cause have been foiled. It is important that while the state bridges the domestic rich classes with the foreign rich through its pro-capitalist foreign policy and economic policy, it denies opportunity for the poor to associate with their brethren outside. The state reveals its class character and performs the international function i.e., facilitating the collaboration of affluent sections of the domestic economy with those of its counterparts, very effectively.
Aforesaid said analysis points out that democratization of foreign policy requires a multiple frontal attack mainly epistemological and political from the Left. Firstly, the terminological bastion of the prevailing foreign policy debates have to be set ablaze, because most of the terms we use in foreign policy talks, for instance national interest and democracy (in procedural definition) are meaningless and unscientific form a critical social science perspective. But foreign policy debates circumvent very important concepts like class character of the state and they give inadequate stress on the political economy of policy making. Majority of media persons who are ill-trained in theory usually popularize the false consciousness. Therefore, the relationship between the domestic class structure of the country and its interactions with the world outside through the medium of foreign policy of the state is to be thoroughly investigated.
Secondly, at the political front two processes are imperative: – 1. Diversifying the mainstream debates on foreign policy through filling the gap of criticism. 2. Percolation of such debates to the grass roots and initiating a debate on alternative from below. It is equally important to understand the difference between ‘democracy as the objective of foreign policy’ and ‘the democratization of foreign policy’. Definitely, only a democratized foreign policy can take democracy as its objective. It requires demolition of the elitised structure of the prevailing foreign policy establishment and radicalization of the process of policy formulation.
Globalization and Indian Diaspora: The Emergence of Transnational Networks of Indian Diasporic Communities
(Abstract)
Dr. Ajaya Kumar Sahoo
Lecturer, Centre for Study of Indian Diaspora University of Hyderabad
Although the Indian emigration has been taking place for centuries, never before in history that India witnessed such massive movements of people from India to other parts of the world as in the 19th and 20th centuries (Bhat 1998). The indentured labor was considered as the landmark in the history of Indian diaspora that pushed millions of Indians to parts of British, Dutch and French colonies of Africa, Europe and North America. Successively, after independence Indians also migrated to Europe and other developed countries such as USA, Canada, New Zealand and Australia as professionals and then as skilled laborer to the Oil Rich countries of Gulf. Among the immigrants of diverse nationalities, overseas Indians today constitute a sizable segment. In terms of sheer numbers, they make the third largest group, next only to the British and the Chinese. The present paper examines the impact of globalization on Indian diaspora and the emergence of transnational networks of Indian diasporic communities.
Presence of diasporic communities world over is brought to the public domain and debate more than ever during the last decade of the 20th century. By then, some of the prominent diasporic communities, such as the Jewish, Armenians and the Chinese Diasporas, had already carved out a specific space for themselves both in the countries of their naturalization and also of origin. It is not long ago that the globally dispersed communities were perceived as ‘minority ethnic groups’, occupying the marginalized / peripheral space in the host society. As rightly observed by James Clifford, by the mid-1980s the “…, diasporic language appears to be replacing, or at least supplementing, minority discourse” (quoted in Vertovec (1997: 277). Though these ‘ethnic minority groups’ always had their linkages with the countries, or places, of their origin, the formal recognition of these linkages by the concerned nation-states is relatively new to emerge. Thanks to the phenomenal advancement in the technologies of travel and communication during the past two decades, the globally dispersed communities have come closer to renew their ties forging the diaspora formations.
During the past two or three decades, there is a revival of ties between the diasporic communities and the countries of their origin under the emerging conditions of contemporary globalization at the threshold of the new Millennium. In a way, diasporas are a product of early ‘globalization’; they have, in fact, emerged following the shifting of population segments - as slaves, victims of persecution or labor - originally from a nation-state to other parts of the globe. While some of the scholars argue that the process of globalization began with the end of World War II, there are others who trace it to the European expansion in the early sixteenth century itself. The concept of globalization as it developed subsequent to modernity, is essentially centered on free flow of capital across the globe, transcending the boundaries of several nation-states. Today there is melting away of certain strands of the nation-state boundaries, allowing free or restricted movement of capital, commodities, communications, labour, professional and skilled personnel. Following the end of the cold war and dismantling of Berlin wall, several of the western states have merged into each other, greater Europe for instance.
Contemporary globalization is propelled by ‘sociotechnological infrastructure’ (Nonini 2000: 565), - social uses and application of new technologies of communication and transport – accelerating the magnitude of migration of people, movement of commodities, ideas and capital more than ever. It has facilitated emergence of cybercommunities or ‘virtual communities and microelectronic transnationalism (Spivac 1989), facilitating formalized and permanent diasporic institutions that link both homeland and host societies, such as family or ethnic business enterprises, cultural organizations, charities, etc.
The challenges and opportunities before diaspora communities in the globalizing world today are also equally the challenges and opportunities before the ‘motherland’ or ancestor land. While in a few cases, such as the Jewish and the Chinese diaspora, there are institutional and organizational arrangements linking the diaspora and the ‘motherland’ already in place, such arrangements have not yet been formalized in the case of many other diasporas. In the globalizing world, there are great opportunities for social, economic and political advancement if only the diaspora together with the ‘motherland’ can seize them, in the fields of business, commerce and industry, technology, education, medicare, culture, etc.
The first challenge is of coming together of Diaspora and the motherland, defining their linkages and expectations, through a constructive dialogue.
Diasporas are highly diversified in their composition and hence their needs and expectations too would widely vary.
Building synergy through extensive networking - Identification and implementation of collaborative, joint enterprises for promoting mutually the economic, scientific, technological and educational advancement. The motherland may initiate programs in these fields seeking participation from the diaspora or the vice-versa.
Being outsiders, the diasporic communities are always targets of discrimination and exploitation by the host society. Diasporic local area or regional associations and global organizations need to be strengthened to meet these challenges.
Initiating associations of common interest groups, such as professional and financial organizations, across the world connecting the diaspora communities. Chinese business rarely gets out of the Chinese hands for they find the diasporic connectivity to promote their common interest.
Diasporic networks could be more effectively established centering the motherland. Formal involvement of the state may facilitate vibrant networking both at the micro and macro level.
‘Consensus’ beneath ‘Contestation’
Civil society, Foreign Policy and the Indian State(Abstract)
K.M.Seethi
(School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University)
Long seen as the realm of explicit academic investigation, the concept of civil society has become so popular today propelled by several national and transnational factors. Central to the discourses on civil society is the changing role of the state, particularly in the global campaigns for promoting development and democratisation. Similar interest in civil society studies is noticeable in academic spheres, resulting in an explosion of researches in the area. However, many such studies end up with the celebration/glorification of civil society as a potential arena for investing ‘social capital’, a euphemism for class accommodation. This is obviously a neoliberal project which sees the state as, inevitably, a retreating agency facilitating an increased mobility of capital, both national and transnational, in places where there is scope for market ambiance. Here, the role of civil society needs to be understood as a surrogate for the welfare state.
Alongside this, civil society has, traditionally, been seen as a site for ‘contestation’ also – against the arbitrary exercise of power by the state. This liberal notion of civil society, by and large, places the liberty of an individual above everything else. As such it constructs a state-civil society dualism. Curiously, the neo-conservatives and the liberal-pluralists have a common meeting ground here, with both representing civil society within a dualistic model, in opposition to the state. Just as the neo-conservatives, the liberal-pluralists also project individualism as a core ideal of civil society and do not address issues of structural inequality. Most of the states in the postcolonial world are undergoing this phase of transition from the “social security-welfare model” to “human security- neo-corporatist model.” India is a case in point. A major domain of negotiations between the neo-corporatist state and the transnational entities is foreign policy which designates its aim as “corporate interest” rather than “national interest.” The state, as such, tries to gain legitimacy for its foreign policy actions through the institutions of civil society, for the latter provide sufficient input-support for reinforcing its dominant ideology and actions. Here, the insights provided by Antonio Gramsci are useful in analysing the domain of foreign policy.
Gramsci conceptualized civil society as a critical element in a framework comprising the state, the economy and civil society. Civil society is inevitably the key locus for creating an ideological foundation of foreign (as well as defence) policy, for building consensus on foreign/defence policy actions and for legitimizing global, regional and bilateral negotiations. This ensures the social hegemony of the foreign/defence policy establishment through ‘consent’ rather than coercion. Civil society, as such, cannot be ‘neutral,’ but an arena where conflicting interests are negotiated and accommodated. The dictum “whoever captures civil society captures all” is relevant in the domain of foreign (and defence) policy. This paper tries to examine how the institutions of civil society have become instrumental in the maintenance of state power, its ideology, its security matrix and foreign policy drawing examples from India.
Intellectual Property Rights and the Indian Policy Shift
Yogesh Anand Pai
§Over the past decade, India has substantially intensified the protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR’s). This has although happened due to a number of concomitant factors, the principal cause can be attributed to India’s obligation under the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). IPR’s are a bundle of exclusive private property rights granted for promoting the progress of science and useful arts. The theoretical underpinning suggests that IPR’s act as incentives for innovation and thus benefits the society as a whole. However the most fundamental rule in case of IPR’s is to exclude competition by others and thus they also impose a social monopoly cost on the society. IPR’s although central to the concept of free markets come along with costs of excluding competition, which equally forms the edifice of free markets. Consequently, the optimal IPR policy would be one which balances the interests of the technology producers’ vis-à-vis the public interest in its use and consumption.
IPR’s involve categories of works which are assured protection through Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, Geographical Indications, Industrial Designs, Layout Design Protection, Plant variety Protection and Trade secrets. While the major debate in the policy shift has occurred in the area of Patents, there have also been significant changes in the law and policy of other forms of IP protection. In fact certain forms of IPR’s have been newly introduced complying with India’s obligation under the TRIPS Agreement, viz., the protection of Geographical Indications, Layout Design Protection and Plant Variety Protection. The existing Patent, Industrial designs, Copyright and Trademark legislations were either drastically amended or reintroduced to fully comply with the TRIPS Agreement Mandate. Thus since a decade and half, India has seen significant reforms in its IP policy in the wake of globalisation under the WTO. While policy shifts in other forms of IPR’s have their own implications on India’s socio-economic growth, the changes in the patent scenario is worth examining in detail. It is mainly due to the impact created by the patent monopoly in India’s ability to achieve economic transformation and social welfare for the ensuing decades.
The Increasing Pressure on Optimal Patent Policy
The non-monopoly origins of the patent system make us believe that the current understanding of the patent law and policy is partially flawed in its approach. The patent system developed out of a vision for industrial development in certain parts of Europe. Patent policies aimed at technology transfer and internal competition accrued Industrial Revolution in Great Brittan in early 19th century. However, this was a period in which there was total flexibility in terms of designing patent policies in favour of territorial or national interests. The second half of 19th century saw international consensus in Patent protection through the Paris Convention of 1883. Even while there were certain minimum obligations, they were non-binding in nature and hence member countries substantially had the freedom to frame policies although with limited flexibilities. The Paris Convention essentially occurred through a process of general consensus which suggests that the member countries formally agreed to standards which were reflective of its internal patent policies. The 20th century saw the rise of United States and a few Asian countries which framed suitable patent polices based upon the then available flexibilities in the international patent norms. Thus if the patent system has a history of delivering on the general socio-economic welfare and growth of certain countries, it can well be seen that the patent system fundamentally focused on its essential object. It was the sovereign countries ability to use those flexibilities that matured the patent system into a tool for socio-economic growth.
However the TRIPS Agreement was a watershed where the individual countries were left with little or no policy options due to limited nature of flexibilities. The binding nature of obligations came out as fetters on countries willingness to bypass the international norms thereby allowing it to frame policies in national interests. Moreover the TRIPS Agreement owes its origin to certain vested corporate interest which lacks sound sense of balance in allowing countries to move on the growth path. It is in this context that we attribute the TRIPS Agreement for disallowing countries to frame optimal patent policies in the light of its socio-economic objectives. Such a pressure is quite visible when we examine the recent policy shifts in the Indian scenario. Further, the attempts for international substantive patent law harmonization and the mounting pressures created by FTA’s (Free Trade Agreements) are testimonial to this syndrome.
India’s Patent Policy Pre-Reforms Era
Although India saw its first Patent Legislation in 1856, the essential policy focus gained momentum only after independence. Two expert committees were established in independent India to study the functional implications of the then prevailing Patents and Designs Act 1911 and to provide suggestions on the type of patent system that India should implement. The Patent Enquiry Committee (1948-50) reported that, “the Indian patent system has failed in its main purpose, namely to stimulate inventions among Indians and to encourage the development and exploitation of new inventions for industrial purposes in the country so as to secure the benefits thereof to the largest section of the public.” The second committee, known as the Justice Ayyangar Committee (1957-59), noted that foreign patentees were acquiring patents not “in the interests of the economy of the country granting the patent or with a view to manufacture there but with the object of protecting an export market from competition from rival manufacturers particularly those in other parts of the world”. The reports concluded that foreigners held 80-90% of the patents in India and were exploiting the system to achieve monopolistic control of the market. The committees therefore suggested that a patent system that focused on access to resources at lower prices would be beneficial to India. The Patent Act of 1970, the current legislation on patents in India, was based on the recommendations of these committees.
The committees suggested abolition of the then existing product patent system for substances intended for use or capable of being used as food or as medicine or drug. Thus with the introduction of the Patent Act in 1970, India provided only process patents in case of pharmaceutical and chemical innovations. This conscious policy choice was made in light of abuse of the patent system by foreign patent holders. Even the term of protection for process patents in case of pharmaceuticals was limited to a maximum of seven years. The general term of protection was also limited to fourteen years. Compulsory licensing was a mechanism through which the abuse of patent rights was sought to be remedied. However in such cases certain criterion was set before any compulsory license could be issued. The patent law also provided for license of rights incase of certain areas where it was felt that everyone should have the right to use the patent straight away without having to listen to patent holders excuses.
Even the patent law criterion was left undefined which ultimately placed judiciary on the upper hand for determining the standards of patentability. Interestingly the Indian judiciary consciously followed a stricter approach in the light of the enshrined policy object of the patent system. In effect, the patent system prior to the economic reforms and TRIPS obligations was conservative in its approach. This accrued immense benefits to the Indian pharmaceutical industry which has today become the largest generic drug producer in the world. Paradoxically, the provision for product patents failed to stimulate innovations in other areas of technology even before the advent of TRIPS. Thus the Indian technology industry can traditionally be understood as not essentially based on the patent framework. Several other factors including a closed license regime was also responsible for lack of innovation and enterprise in different areas of technology in India.
India’s Patent Policy Post-Reform Era
The reforms invoked in the early 1990 have changed the whole policy and legal outlook underlying the Patent regime in India. Although such reforms have been initiated in the light of TRIPS Agreement under the WTO, it appears that there are few more reasons than what meets the eye. Although India as a developing country initially argued against the inclusion of IPR’s under the WTO framework, the current policy seems to suggest a different approach. A couple of major factors have influenced the current patent policy namely:
The changing alliances in the industry: The certain sections of the Indian industry are working on patent based business models which presuppose Indian investments in R&D. What could also be seen is a spate of mergers and acquisitions by foreign forms in India and by Indian firms across the globe. The increasing consolidation in the Indian industry has changed the equations of optimal patent policy needed to achieve socio-economic goals.
IP as a tool for attracting FDI: The current policy of industrial development based on foreign capital is believed to presuppose stronger IPR’s. It is viewed that investments occur only when there is strong IP policy in favour of protecting foreign capital investments. Thus even while there exist certain policy space in the international IP regime, it is the willingness of national governments to use those spaces that makes the real difference.
Thus from a low protection patent regime India has seen a significant shift upward. The following were the major changes made to the Patents Act, 1970 since the post reform era:
Advent of the product patent regime for all form of technologies without any discrimination since 2005.
Increase in the Patent term for 20 years for both products as well as processes.
Provision of exclusive marketing rights in case of mailbox applications during the transitional period from 1995-2005.
Specific definition of patent law thresholds which was earlier left to judicial interpretations.
Abolition of licensing of rights.
Narrower compulsory licensing provisions without proper time framework.
Reversal of burden of proof incase of process patents.
Patents for new subject matter including micro-organisms.
Implications of the policy shift
One of the major criticisms of the current Indian patent policy is the allowance of product patents for drugs and chemicals, which it would have preferred to avoid, but for the TRIPS mandate. Although certain sections of the Indian industry have matured into global firms, the vast majority of the industry is still based on foreign technology absorption and minimal R&D investments. However, the current policy also envisages certain stop gap arrangements for existing generic production and also measures which could exclude minor innovations. However, such interpretation is left to the domain of judiciary which possesses a tremendous possibility of bypassing the public interest policy and stronger interpretation of private property rights in information. This has put the whole issue of access and affordability of patented drugs and the consequent drying up of generic sources.
The economic significance test introduced into the inventive step criterion has also invited equal criticism. While the patent system was traditionally designed for innovations worth protecting, it has slowly shifted its stance in favour of investments worth protecting. This has economic implications inasmuch as economic feasibility, even without improvements in technology may still be protected under the patents regime. The current definitions on patent law thresholds introduced, even while there exists sufficient flexibility under TRIPS, represents a significant shift from the traditional notions of patentability. The guideline issued by the Indian Patent Office also suggests the same.
The subject matter of patents has also been expanded in the wake of TRIPS to include micro-organisms. Thus a clear policy of excluding DNA patents and patents on essential sequence tags (EST’s) seems to haunt the existing patentability standards. Certain innovations in the areas of biotechnology form tools for ensuing innovations since the innovations in this arena are both sequential and complementary. Thus the whole question of rapid innovation in this area is under debate due to anti-common effects in the biotech inventions.
The compulsory licensing provisions have also invited criticisms due to lack of time frame which could frustrate the purpose behind ensuring competition principles within the Patent scheme. Before the advent of the product patent regime incase of drugs and chemicals the existence of the time frame was not a sensitive issue but the position has altered without ensuring significant protection against abuse of patent monopoly.
On a larger economic framework it could be seen that innovations would occur through a vertical structure without significant horizontal transfer of technology. It means that existing innovators would be highly benefited through a patent system that excludes fair competition. Thus in the long run cartelization is an outcome. This essentially undermines the very object of free markets thus inducing additional socio-economic costs on market economies. The policy shift in favour of stronger IPR’s need not necessarily bring in larger investments. There is always a possibility of the IP holder exploiting the market through importation right thus putting the IP-investment link into question. What is expected out of a patent regime must be clearly understood in the light of socio-economic objects from a developing country’s perspective. If socio-economic equity is a Constitutional goal, it goes without saying that IP policy must be designed and implemented based on competition factors rather than being totally carried away by economic arguments in favour of certain sections of the industry.
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INDIA-UNITED STATES NUCLEAR DEAL: ISSUES AND CHALLENGESM.J.Vinod**
India and the United States have made major strides in their bilateral ties in the recent times. Perhaps areas in India-US relations highlight the transformation in bilateral relations more than defence, strategic and nuclear cooperation. India-United States relations, which used to be on a roller coaster ride during the cold war, have been witnessing radical and monumental changes since then. One such manifestation of this is the India–US nuclear deal. India-US relations have been developing on two important pillars: One, the common democratic values and traditions; and two, the increasing overlapping national and geo-strategic interests of the two countries. The India-US civilian nuclear cooperation deal struck in July 2005 and the subsequent developments in this context have generated an intense debate within the policy-making establishment and the civil societies of both the countries. The India-US nuclear deal is an historic agreement that perhaps brings India into the non-proliferation mainstream. The deal has raised fundamental questions about the future of the nonproliferation regime. A whole debate still continues about the extent to which the deal is a judicious mix between India’s long-term energy and security interests and the expectation of the international community to insulate as many of India’s nuclear plants from potential military applications.
The paper will attempt to locate these developments in terms of the following issues:
The contemporary status of India’s nuclear programme
The nuclear deal and its strategic implications
The nuclear deal and energy cooperation
The nuclear deal and minimum deterrence
The nuclear deal and IAEA India-specific safeguards
The current negotiations on the 123 Agreement.
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**Dr. M.J.Vinod is Professor and Chairman, Dept. of Political Science, Bangalore University, Bangalore 560056. Email: mjvinod@hotmail.com
Reading the Tea Leaves of India-China Subregional Visions
Dr Nimmi Kurian Associate Professor Centre for Policy Research
Abstract
The shifting border discourse in India and China is powered by their vision to integrate their peripheries with the extended neighbourhood. Sub-regional economic zones or growth triangles envisage geographically proximate sub-regions within two or more countries as important sites of transnational economic exchange. China’s goal of developing its southwestern region coincides with India’s own domestic imperative of rapid development of its Northeast. For both India and China, starting a subregional discourse holds considerable emancipatory potential by focusing on issues that have a direct bearing on the people living on the frontiers. It also opens the space for direct stakeholder participation and institutional mechanisms of cooperation by addressing issues of governance, livelihood and resource-sharing among others. These find no place within politico-military frames of decision making which can at best only offer suboptimal solutions for issues that are deterritorialised in nature. Interestingly, such a discourse would have its greatest effect on the borders by building trust and paving the way for issue-based linkages.
As India and China make moves to redefine their land borders as bridges that are effective bearers of their influence across the region, the critical question that needs to be asked is whether their subregional visions will coincide or not. A dialogue towards a mutually acceptable conception of peace in the subregion would be a necessary first step towards this. Unless their conceptions of peace coincide, any move to explore transborder cooperation will be a non-starter. Since the security perceptions of a state are always relational, India will read China’s border signals in terms of the level of trust these will inspire. The repeated invocation of rigid notions of territoriality clearly stands to unravel the potential for a new border discourse to emerge that could transcend this logic to mutual benefit. While the logic of the former would result in the border being little more than a military line, the latter would reconstruct the same as a dynamic gateway. While one would stimulate wariness, the other would help create joint stakes in peace.
China’s southern thrust presents India with opportunities as well as challenges. If India boldly seizes the initiative and seeks continental connections, the Northeast too stands to gain many of the same advantages that have accrued to China’s border provinces. This will not be easy by any means as India comes to terms with China’s rising economic, strategic and physical presence in its neighbourhood. There will be concerns that China’s transport corridors in the region are opening for it multiple access routes to the east and the west, boosting its strategic manoeuvrability considerably in the process. These are likely to induce a certain reserve on the part of India to support Chinese initiatives to foster multi-dimensional trans-border linkages. The unresolved border dispute will only serve to further aggravate this resistance. India will thus appear Janus-faced, willing to engage China bilaterally but clearly not comfortable with engaging it sub-regionally. This will also be reflected in India’s moves to intensify external linkages with Southeast Asia and its reluctance to open up the Northeast to China. Such a posture while having its own rationale might, however, prove untenable in the long run.
Regardless of the direction in which transborder linkages are eventually sought, what will be of utmost importance will be the implications these hold for the economic future of the Northeast. The promise of trade-fostering industrialisation will depend critically on the Northeast being able to realise its potential based on its own indigenous resource endowments. If one looks at the current export basket of India’s border trade, the Northeast as a region does not enjoy a comparative advantage in any of the products being traded. If the region remains a mere conduit for exports on account of its location, the Northeast will only gain minimal benefits. From being on the margins of closed borders it will be far more tragic if the Northeast is reduced to being on the edge of an open economy.
A Critique of Neo-liberal Reforms in the Context of India
Gilbert Sebastian
Abstract
Neo-liberal reforms or ‘globalisation’ in popular coinage may be viewed as a process of transnationalisation of oligopolistic capital which is still nationally organised and hierarchically ordered. Peasant suicides and volatility in the prices of agricultural commodities; accentuation of rentier exchange relations; jobless, dependent and volatile growth; exclusion of the hitherto marginalised sections; growth of fascistic communal trend and a more repressive State in the political realm; etc. may be identified as the impact of the neo-liberal reforms in India. If impact is something already visible, the implications of globalisation are futuristic and yet to unfold.
There has been an enormous spurt in the growth of speculative capital atop the real economy during the 20th century. One of the apparent fall-outs of the gigantic growth of speculative capital has been spectacular economic collapses as in Mexico (1994-95), South East Asia (1997-98), etc. Moreover, not much FDI has flowed to the peripheral regions, namely, Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe and Asia, with the sole exception of China. In India, about 50 per cent of the total foreign investment during 1992-93 to 2000-01 has been speculative portfolio investments. Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) is a major route of FDI flows today. In the latter part of the 1990s, 40 per cent of the total FDI inflow into our country came in the form of M&As. This involved buying out of existing productive capacities; it might also increase concentration. The track record of even ‘green-field investment’, i.e. those really bringing capital resources into the country has often been not encouraging if we consider instances of Enron in Maharashtra, AES and POSCO in Orissa, etc. The ‘deemed foreign enclaves’ in the form of Special Economic Zones have contributed little in terms of development as distinct from growth. These facts raise a legitimate concern as to whether the neo-liberal ‘developmentalism’ that is being aggressively promoted is indeed capable of ushering in development of productive forces and meeting the concerns of welfare of the broad masses of people in our native economies?
In conclusion, we seek solutions in the realm of alternative political movements and/or in the realm of the State. The thrust of the policy orientation of the State needs to be to achieve ‘self reliance’ and domestic investment should be given the pride of place if the country is to achieve self-reliance. Finance and agriculture deserve the utmost importance from the perspective of self-reliance. Focus on the agricultural sector is important from the angle of livelihood and on the financial sector, from the angle of the very sustainability of the economy. Particularly under ‘liberalization’, there is the crucial need for regulatory measures such as competition policy and corporate governance. It would be a crude naivety and gross lack of historical sense to consider the current phase of imperialist globalisation as irreversible and therefore a process that we need to inevitably cope with. It would be more appropriate to consider it as a stage of history that we are currently experiencing.
The Indian Diaspora and Foreign Policy
A.M. Thomas *
The significant role of the diaspora in a country’s foreign policy has come to be increasingly recognised during the past decade and a half. There are instances of powerful and influential diasporas playing an important role in shaping the host country’s as well as the home country’s domestic and foreign policies. The Indian diaspora is a large one, the result mainly of migrations that have taken place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This diaspora can broadly be divided into two -- the Old diaspora in Africa, West Indies, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific and Indian Ocean islands; and the New diaspora in the countries of the West and West Asia. Traditionally India’s policy has been to encourage people of Indian origin to integrate themselves into the host societies. They were also not accorded any special status by the Government of India. The New diaspora’s economic prowess and political influence in the respective host countries has led to the acknowledgement by policymakers that it is to India’s advantage to make use of these capabilities. Since the 1990s, governments have been making serious efforts to enlist the support of the diaspora in various ways. Policies and actions have ranged from a systematic gathering of statistics on the extent of the diaspora to the granting of Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) to people of Indian origin. Efforts also include making use of lobbying groups in countries of the diaspora for the purpose of persuading decision makers there to take pro Indian positions. This paper is an attempt to examine the transformation of Indian policy towards the diaspora.
* A.M. Thomas is Reader, School of International Relations and Politics,
Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam.
Keynote Paper
India’s Foreign Policy : Emerging Trends in the New Century
R.SWAMINATHAN IPS (Rtd.)
At the outset, I would like to express my gratitude to the V.K. Krishna Menon Study Centre for International Relations, University of Kerala, for this opportunity to present before a distinguished and discerning audience some of my views on “India’s Foreign Policy : Emerging Trends in the New Century”.
There are at least two methodologies to approach the broad theme of this seminar. One would be the conventional method of taking stock of developments like India’s “Look East” policy, the emerging “strategic cooperation” between India and China, the developing “strategic partnership” between India and USA, the restructuring of Indo-Russian relations, Russian impatience with the perceived evolution of US-centric unipolar world order etc. and discuss how to proceed further. The other method, which I prefer to adopt in this paper, is to have an overall look at the current and emerging international situation and try to evolve some guidelines for an effective and successful foreign policy in the 21st century.
Certain Basic Formulations
Please let me start with a listing of what I consider to be some of the basic formulations that should guide the evolution of India’s foreign policy in the new century.
The other day, I read a “blog” on the internet in which a “Person of Indian Origin” spoke of India’s pretensions of becoming a superpower. My obvious initial reaction was one of outrage; but as I read the entire piece, I realized that the person was prejudiced against his home country and/or very misinformed. I wished that he had used “ambition” or “aspiration” in place of “pretensions”. The facts, as I see them are that India is already a significant power, which is speeding on its way to becoming a big power; and that this has been recognized by many countries - though many academics and other intellectuals in our own country have not yet grown to accept this reality. Indian intellectuals and analysts (and seemingly many in our foreign policy establishment) have for so long been used to India being strong on rhetoric but an under-achiever, that it is not easy for many to see that the ugly duckling is growing into a beautiful swan. One of the reasons may be that India is trying to achieve and is achieving in a few years what many other significant powers could comfortably achieve in many decades – as the world gradually evolved from the Middle Ages to the modern era. In the process, many intermediate steps are being skipped (as has happened in many areas of our technological development) and the accelerated growth is not easy to cope with. The first requirement therefore is for such academics, intellectuals and foreign policy establishment to accept that India has grown out of her exploited under-dog status of nearly two centuries and to realize the potential of our current status as a significant power – economically as a matter of fact, militarily as a matter of relative strengths, and politically if we can learn to leverage them to our national advantage. Along with that, it has also to be recognized that India’s changed (and changing) status has also caused significant changes in the expectations of other countries about India’s involvement in world affairs. A change in our mind-set is therefore necessary.
A comparison could be made with China easing in comfortably into her emerging status as a significant (or even big) power. It is well to remember that China and India had both been significant powers centuries ago. However, China (which was not as colonized as India was) has had an easier task. Inspired by her perennial “Middle Kingdom syndrome”, China could get back into her big-power ways, overcoming the limitations imposed by a long period of foreign influence in her affairs. India, on the other hand, seems to have allowed foreign invasions and colonial rule to make her forget her glory days, except in speeches and school text books. During the colonial era, India had no foreign policy of its own, as the policy was made in Whitehall to sub serve British interests. Even many years after independence, many intellectuals in think tanks and many in the foreign policy establishment have continued to let their thought processes be unduly influenced by western thought processes (with some, of course, tilting the other way). Jawahar Lal Nehru’s famous directive about the nomenclature of geographical regions was not followed up further and taken to its logical conclusion. It is time that we developed and nurtured our own (Indian) thinking about world affairs.
Economics has, over the past many decades, been gradually replacing territorial and imperial ambitions as the prime mover behind international relations. India has achieved a lot in the economic field since the policies of liberalization and globalization were brought into play. The aphorism that less government leads to good governance is being proved to the hilt. The innate genius of the Indian people has started blossoming and the Indian economy is generally thriving in international competition. People-to-people and business-to-business relations have taken their rightful places in economic relations between India and other countries. In the field of economics, the world is rapidly becoming multi-polar, with multiple foci of economic power. As observed by my good friend Balachandran (The Asian Age, 7 March 2007), globalization has resulted in the corporate sector playing important roles (earlier mostly played by governments) in areas such as heavy industries, communications, financial and commercial management etc. Although foreign policy is made by governments, commercial and social groups are pursuing their own foreign relations, which often outperform government initiatives. One could cite the various initiatives of FICCI, ASSOCHAM, CII, US-India Business Council, India-China Business Alliance etc. The role played by such organizations during the negotiations on the US-India civilian nuclear agreement is still fresh in our memory. Multinational commercial entities also pursue their own foreign relations, (often blurring or ignoring international borders), which act as compelling ingredients in the evolution of the foreign or commercial policy of a country, e.g. the influence of Boeing on US-China policy.
We have to consider whether this route could not be adopted mutatis mutandis in the area of political relations also. It is possible that people to people relations and the media can act as pressure groups to evolve some kind of synthesis between differing security and political interests and priorities of India and other countries. Intellectuals, human rights workers, lawyers, press corps, artistes and film stars could easily set in motion a closer understanding between different countries to compel their governments to agree that cooperation on ecology and efforts to eradicate poverty and deprivation should receive higher priorities than narrow polemics. When the peoples of two countries develop a vested interest in good relations between their countries, the governments would have to follow suit. Though security services may have some reservations about this process, the benefits of regime neutralisation (as opposed to regime change) should help in overcoming those reservations.
As an example of how people-to-people cooperation could be used effectively to supplement and strengthen the efforts of governments, let us look at the example of Palk Bay, where the fishing communities on both sides had jointly exploited (with hardly any outside intervention) the marine resources for centuries. If the two governments would restore to those communities the right and responsibility to work out friendly, cooperative and sustainable fishing in these waters, the problem could probably be solved amicably. The two governments could encourage and facilitate whatever the fishermen are able to agree upon and reserve the waters of the Palk Bay for joint and co-operative fishing exclusively by artisanal fishermen of the littoral fishing communities.
The reality that the era of superpowers (and of “gunboat diplomacy”) has ended has to be recognized. Even at the height (or the nadir) of the Cold war, the “authority” of the two superpowers was more perceived than real and they were never certain of unqualified support from their “allies” without resort to binding treaties and occasional threats of punitive action. Their writs ran more through fear of the opposite camp than by acceptance. The severe limitations of “superpower” authority have been exposed in Afghanistan, Iraq, DPRK, Iran etc In the present international situation, which has often been described as unipolar, with USA being the sole superpower, US foreign policy is probably more feared and loathed than admired or willingly accepted. Is it possible to cite instances where the US leadership has been accepted by willing consent, without financial and other incentives, without fear of sanctions and/or naked aggression? Russia and China have already started expressing their misgivings about US postures. The writ of the US Government does not always run in its own backyard of Latin America, as shown during the recent multi-nation visit of President Bush. The experience of USA should also signal that the use of military power is no longer a viable substitute for effective diplomacy and negotiation.
The terms of bipolar or unipolar international order seem to have lost their relevance. What we are likely to see as the current century progresses would be the emergence of multiple centers of political and economic power and influence, highlighting the need to achieve a stable equilibrium amongst them. The threat of economic losses and instability would become a strong incentive for all economically powerful countries to cooperate and work together.
Certain Guidelines
On the basis of the above formulations, it is possible to list some guidelines (not necessarily in the order of importance) for making India’s foreign policy in the twenty first century. It may be argued that these are mere platitudes, but a careful and objective analysis will show their practical applications in specific cases. India has no doubt practiced one or more of these on different issues from time to time, but with our growing status as an emerging big power, these need to become permanent characteristics of our foreign policy.
Overall national interest should always be the primary and supreme consideration. There should be no embarrassment in placing national interest at the top of our agenda.
Our foreign and national security policies should be dovetailed, in private and in public.
We should act as a responsible significant (or big) power, whose views and policies are of importance to many other countries. The luxury of making or taking not-so-well-thought-out statements and actions relating to other countries is no longer available to India.
There should be some continuity and predictability in our foreign policy. These would be hallmarks of a significant, mature and self-confident power. If we do not have a viable long-term strategy, foreign policy swings would become inevitable, resulting in a lack of credibility.
As in the case of National Security Policy, there should be, as far as possible, a National Foreign Policy, and not merely that of the party (or parties) in power. All efforts need to be made to have a national political consensus on major foreign policy issues, so that the concerned countries are aware that they are dealing with a stable country and not merely with a transient government. The present UPA Government under Dr. Man Mohan Singh has undertaken many significant consultations on certain foreign policy issues. [In this context, a worthwhile effort would be to set up an independent think-tank, on the lines of the US Congressional Research Service, to study various issues and provide objective position papers to all Members of Parliament.]
Domestic politics and partisan interests could be major inputs during the stage of consultations, but should not become reasons for casting doubts on the credibility of the foreign policy of the country. We have unfortunately been having too many such instances in recent years. An example of how the removal of domestic politics from the equation can benefit international relations is the 3 March 2007 agreement between the Directors General of India’s Border Security Force and Bangla Desh Rifles.
We should develop the art of looking at issues also from the perspective of the other country. [Intelligence and security analysts are taught and trained to get into the mind of the other person, to assess the possible plans, reactions and threats from such person.] This would help in avoiding over-sensitivity and any unjustified sense of mistrust. For instance, a relatively innocuous action taken by China in her own national interest could otherwise be misinterpreted by India as an unfriendly (or even a hostile) act.
There should be more transparency in our policy-making process. We should consider making public disclosure, subject to security requirements, of our reasons – security, strategic, financial, and commercial - for making compromises or for taking specific actions, to enable others look at issues from our perspective and avoid misunderstandings. We should be unambiguous, in public or in private, in expressing our sensitivities on specific issues to the concerned countries. Such transparency may not always extend to diplomatic actions taken in specific cases. As the Prime Minister had stated in his letter of 14 March 2007 to L.K.Advani, “We do not believe in conducting diplomacy in public”.
In a democracy, the government cannot be considered to be the depository of all wisdom on all issues. The policy-makers should be open to inputs also from outside the government, particularly from academia. India is already following this to some extent in the evolution of financial and economic policies.
Guidelines are general in nature and cannot always be rigidly adhered to. A certain amount of customization would be necessary relating to specific countries and specific situations.
Without trying to reinvent the wheel, we could draw suitable lessons from the successes and failures in history. Just as we take vitamins and other dietary supplements to build up energy and muscles, it would not hurt if academics, intellectuals and the foreign policy establishment could adopt certain principles as below.
National pride, short of chauvinism.
A rosy vision of the future, short of fantasy.
Boldness, short of mindless audacity.
Self-confidence, short of arrogance.
Logical thinking, short of paralysis by analysis.
Firmness, tempered by compassion.
Involvement with problems of smaller neighbours, short of unsolicited intervention.
Specialists in various disciplines are scheduled to address different segments of this seminar on subjects like India and the New Global Order, Globalisation and the Indian Economy, India and the Great Powers, India and the Shifting Security Scenario in South Asia and India and its Neighbourhood Diplomacy. I shall therefore offer (for the record) only some brief remarks on some of the emerging trends in India’s international relations.
Big Powers
When we consider relations with big powers, we have to take into account all countries and entities that would be economically powerful in the next few years. We have to factor in the reality that some of them would attempt to leverage economic power into political clout and attempt to influence other countries. The list of countries and entities that are likely to qualify in this league would include (in addition to India) Australia, Brazil, China, Germany, Japan, Russia, USA, ASEAN, OPEC and EU; and more may join the ranks as the century progresses. India has rapidly to grow up into dealing with these countries/entities on equal terms, understand and try to accommodate each one’s prime interests (subject to India’s own national interests) and avoid unnecessary confrontation on minor issues. It will be a not-too-easy balancing act, with high stakes involved.
The colonial legacy of being more understanding and accommodative of the concerns of western countries is still quite dominant in the thought-processes of many think-tanks and the foreign policy establishment, except when it is fashionable to be anti-west on specific issues. With our words and actions being studied more than before, India has to make a special effort to be visibly neutral – unless otherwise dictated by national interest.
Neighbourhood
India has seven neighbours with shared borders, i.e. Pakistan, China, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. Maldives and ASEAN should also be considered as neighbours, for the evolution of India’s foreign policy. One tends to forget that the nearest landfall in ASEAN is less than 100 kms from Indra Point.
China
China, apart from being a Big Power, is also a significant neighbour and merits special attention. The progress towards India-China strategic cooperation has not eliminated Chinese concern at the growing India-US strategic partnership. India’s foreign policy establishment seems to be fairly clear about the difference between “strategic cooperation” and “strategic partnership”. Strategic cooperation would imply an exchange and coordination of views by two countries on the common challenges posed in the political, security and economic spheres. Strategic partnership, on the other hand, would imply a relationship which would not only incorporate strategic cooperation but also an added emphasis on converting the strategic convergences between two nations into more meaningful defence and security cooperation, joint military training and exercises, defence production and hi-tech exchanges and shouldering of some common defence commitments.
China has displayed a remarkable consistency in its dealings in India’s neighbourhood. It is overtly friendly to Pakistan and Bangladesh, though both have been harbouring cross border terrorist organizations (operating against India) within their territories. Further, when India supported the democratic movement in Myanmar, China showed pragmatism and supported the military junta. Air Chief Marshal S P Tyagi, Chief of Air Staff, had mentioned in November 2005 (B.C.Joshi Memorial Lecture at Pune University) that “China's strategic encirclement of India is already well under way. …. China is likely to view India as a regional economic threat and perhaps would be forced to attempt to stem its growth and influence in the region.” China has also started taking significant steps in Africa. Obviously, one of the worst nightmares of strategic thinkers would relate to India being encircled by hostile neighbours supported by China.
Even while progressing a close and comfortable relationship with China, India has to consider very carefully the implications to India’s security and economic interests of various Chinese actions. It may not be necessary to take reactive counter-measures at each and every stage, but our own policies and actions in various regions and on various issues have to be devised suitably to protect our overall national interests.
Pakistan and Bangla Desh
Pakistan and Bangla Desh pose special security and other problems, which stem largely from historical and geo-political reasons and are mostly caused or subscribed to by State actors. The ruling elites in both the countries seem to have adopted anti-India stance as a part of the basic foundation of their national identities and policies. India’s internal security, as well as regional security, is threatened due to their unwillingness or inability to prevent jihadi extremist groups from carrying out cross-border terrorist operations. The jihadi bases in the “ungoverned” areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and Pakistan’s perceived status as a close ally of USA in the “global war on terror” have created a piquant situation. India has shown a fair amount of sophistication and pragmatism in formulating and pursuing her foreign policy vis-à-vis Pakistan; but a similar approach is not apparent in relation to Bangla Desh.
Smaller Neighbours
The previous National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Government had made India virtually invisible in its neighbourhood, ceding influence to the USA and other western powers - due to certain over-emphasis on developing a strategic relationship with the US, its over-anxious solicitation of support for India's bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council and in unsuccessful efforts to bring pressure on Pakistan to stop its sponsorship of terrorism in Indian territory. The present UPA government has been quietly trying to reverse this trend, without openly protesting about the increased involvement of the west in India's neighbourhood, but steadily seeking to regain the influence which India had traditionally enjoyed in this region.
India’s difficulties in maintaining friendly and cordial relations with her smaller neighbours may be due to her inability to deal with them as equals. The smaller neighbours are naturally worried about the asymmetry in size, human and material resources and economic and military strength. India’s perceived willingness and tendency to assert its national interests (e.g. India’s role in the creation of Bangla Desh, alleged Indian support to the Tamil movements in Sri Lanka); Indian encouragement and support to its political favourites in the countries of the region (e.g. India’s soft corner for the opposition Awami League in Bangla Desh and for the democratic forces in Nepal); and continuing differences relating to the utilization of water resources. The affected countries tend to guard themselves by avoiding the development of very close (and possibly dependent) economic linkages with India, by developing (balancing) economic and military linkages with China. These are amongst the factors that make it difficult to generate full confidence about balanced and equal relationships with the smaller neighbours. This often results in positions of near hostility, suspicion and distrust of India. . The need of the hour is to avoid being perceived as the ubiquitous “Big Brother”, but function more as the benevolent and helpful karta of a joint family.
India has shown considerable maturity and responsibility in dealing with Bhutan. Where necessary (like eliminating ULFA bases in Bhutan), India has been firm; and, where possible, (like in the matter of revision of the Indo-Bhutan Treaty) India has been understanding and helpful. Despite being a Sunni Muslim country, the Maldives (under President Gayoom) has historically looked up to India as its well-wisher and benefactor. The confrontation between the government and the pro-democracy elements has the seeds of potential instability which could be exploited by jihadi elements based elsewhere. Though concerned about the absence of genuine democracy in the Maldives, India has reasons to be gratified over the Maldivian government’s success in keeping extremist influence away from the Maldives.
However, similar maturity, pro-active approach, pragmatism and helpful understanding have not been too evident in relation to Nepal, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. The developing situations in these three countries have the intrinsic capability to affect India’s security significantly. The growing involvement of the Maoists in the governance of Nepal has the potential of encouraging the activities of the Maoists in India’s “red corridor”. India's ability to restore peace in the North-East depends a lot on the co-operation of the Government of Myanmar and the latter’s success in establishing an effective administrative and military presence in its northern territories. The effects of the Sri Lankan situation on India’s security interests are well known and needs no repetition.
ASEAN
Most of ASEAN, as well as Japan and South Korea, are apprehensive of possible Chinese expansionism in South East Asia. The Chinese Defence Minister Cao Gangchuan, when he was the army chief earlier, had proposed Chinese force projection beyond the South China Sea. In the absence of any strategic competition within the region, with Japan having gone into a shell, and with the increased availability of additional resources due to the booming Chinese economy, China has continually been expanding its presence and influence in ASEAN. What China seems to be attempting is to get hegemony over its own backyard and then make the leap to being a power to challenge the United States. India’s somewhat hesitant efforts to improve political, economic and military relations with the ASEAN countries require to be intensified without any further delay.
Conclusion
In the early years of India’s independence, when India was relatively weak economically and militarily, Jawahar Lal Nehru evolved a foreign policy that got a certain global stature at the forefront of the non-aligned movement. It made a lot of sense for many newly-independent countries to avoid getting sucked into the Cold War confrontations, though John Foster Dulles termed it “immoral”. Now, with the growing status of India as an economic powerhouse and a regional military power, India needs to be “rediscovered” and the foreign policy redefined. Intellectuals and policy makers have to start thinking differently, to reflect the changing status of India in world affairs. There was a slogan many years ago, saying “Be Indian, Buy Indian”. We could profitably say now “Be Indian, Think Indian”.
[This paper was prepared on 20 March 2007 by R.Swaminathan, a retired member of the Indian Police Service and former Special Secretary, DG (Security), Government of India, for delivery as Keynote Address at the National Seminar on this subject being organised by the V.K. Krishna Menon Study Centre for International Relations, University of Kerala, at Trivandrum on 2-3 April 2007. The author gratefully acknowledges his debt to those whose views and words may figure in this paper – but accepts full responsibility. He can be contacted at rsnathan@gmail.com]
Strategic Shift in Indo-US Relations: The China Factor
Dr. Joseph Antony
F.M.N.College, Kollam
The Post-Cold War world has delivered a new international system entirely different from that of the Cold War. The emergence of the United States as the sole Super Power of the world has been its hallmark. But the unquestioned superiority of the US was challenged with the destruction of the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre in 2001. Along with that, the new millennium has been witnessing a phenomenal rise of China as a military and economic challenger to the USA. These developments have forced the American administration to drastically redefine its global vision. And George W. Bush is the chief apostle of this aggressive global agenda of the new American Empire.
As a region of China and of Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Palestine, India and Pakistan, it is quite natural that the US focuses its utmost attention towards this hot spot of Asia. The emerging Indo-US relation, supported by a crucial agreement on the Civilian Nuclear deal is significant in this global and regional scenario. Moreover, the strategic shift in Indo-US relations got much significance in the backdrop of a security-driven global vision of Bush dispensation.
According to the US administration, the major theme of Indo-US relation is “to help India become a major power in the 21st century.” This theme has emerged from the “conviction”, stated in the US National Security Strategy 2002, “that the US interests require a strong relationship with India.” What for? None other than Congressman Henry Hyde, after whom the India-US nuclear deal legislation is named, explained in introducing it, “a major argument in favour” was that “a clear relationship with India is needed to offset the rising power of China.” India’s former Foreign Secretary and Indian Ambassador to the US, Lalit Mansingh stated that “Bush and his team considered India as a counterweight and not a lighter weight against China.” Many a US strategic document have publicly declared “China as the only potential long term military threat to the US.” India too has some accounts to settle with China.
This congruence of common interests have coerced both the US and India to cooperate in a grand strategy targeting China. China too fears a hidden agenda in the emerging Indo-US relations.
The emerging Indo-US relations have a subtext, which is aimed at containing a rising China. It may be necessary for the US to contain a military and economic challenger, China. While aligning with the sole Super Power of the world, India should be careful not to be dragged in the dubious containment strategy of the United States. If it participates, India will be a looser, not the US.
Theories of Mergers and Takeovers and the Experience of Indian Firms Under Neo-Liberal Reforms
Abstract
Beena
Mergers and acquisitions are a regular and much noted feature in the present global corporate environment. Among the primary motives behind mergers identified by the literature are a firm's need to improve market coverage, garner promotional profits, expand production without price reduction, acquire capacity at reduced prices, obtain real or pecuniary economies of scale, rationalize production using complementary inputs, and diversify into new products and markets. (Jervis, 1971). Acquisitions are undertaken to compensate for instabilities such as wide fluctuations in demand and product mix, excess capacities related to slow sales growth and declining profit margins and technological shocks (Alexandra Post,1994). Consolidation can also be used as a means of restructuring and enhancing a firm's equity base in order to gain access to credit, improve cash flow and exploit tax advantages. Firms regard mergers as an opportunity for immediately increasing capacity and for gaining greater control over the market in a period of expanding and favourable economic conditions (Weston et.al, 1996). Availability of capital to finance Acquisitions and innovations in financial markets such as junk bonds can also be one of the reasons for cross-border Mergers (Sudersanam, 1995). The valuation differences of the share prices or economic disturbances lead to acquisitions of firms that are low-valued from the viewpoint of outsiders (Gort, 1969). Lower interest rates also lead to more acquisitions, as acquiring firms rely heavily on borrowed funds (Melicher et.al, 1983). Further, the motives behind transnational or cross-border acquisitions differ from those, which drive purely domestic acquisitions. An acquiring firm might decide to go in for international Merger in order to take advantage of cheap raw materials and labour, to capture profits from exchange rates, or to invest its surplus cash (Weston J. Fred et. al, 1996). The currency devaluations in the crisis-affected countries as well as falling property prices reduced the foreign-currency cost of acquiring fixed assets. Further it is noticed that the financial turmoil in Asia provided a golden opportunity for TNCs to enter local markets (Zhan,2001, p.24). While there are firm-specific motives for undertaking CBM&As, there are also economic forces, which have acted to encourage the CBM&As, such as the economic integration of the European Union (EU) and NAFTA represented by the creation of a single market. Globalisation of the market-place for many products, with the convergence of consumer needs, preferences and tastes, increase in competition which has assumed a global character with companies competing in several markets are cited as other reasons for the CB Mergers. The relative importance of these motives would differ between firms in any particular economy and between one economy and another.
The principal objective of this paper is to analyse the motives behind and the consequences of the merger process during 1990-2005. An attempt has also been made to characterise the nature of merger activity and highlight some theoretical and empirical observations on merger activity available from the literature. Acquisitions and Mergers, although always an important means of corporate growth during the post-1947 period, became much more prominent since 1990s in the Indian corporate sector. The trend of M&As continues into the early 2000s, with their numbers increasing significantly by the day. A majority of the acquiring firms belonged to the manufacturing sector throughout the period, 1990-2005, although the number of M&As in the non-manufacturing sector has also shown a sharp increase during the period. The evidence also shows that the share of private limited firms involved in the M&A process was higher in the non-manufacturing sector than in the manufacturing sector. The number of Mergers was always higher than the number of Acquisitions throughout this period. However, a sharp increase in Acquisitions has been in evidence since the mid-1990s. Majority of the Acquisition deals during 1995-2005 are related to foreign-owned corporations. Profitability or price-cost margin of acquiring firms has not shown significant improvement vis-à-vis the corporate sector in the country as a whole during the aforementioned period. The analysis reveals that the average ratio of Shareholders’ Profit and Dividend per Equity of sample acquiring firms for the period of 1990-2005 is relatively higher with these firms than with the Indian Corporate sector. It is also clear that capacity utilisation of these acquiring firms is lower than in the Indian corporate sector. However, there is no significant difference in the average performance of these acquiring firms during 1990-2005 as compared to the overall performance of the Indian corporate sector. On the basis of available evidence, we argue that enhancing size in terms of corporate control and market share could be the motivations for the M&A phenomenon in the Indian corporate sector.
NEGOTIATING ETHNO-NATIONALISM:
IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA
(Abstract)
Dr.Dimpi V.Divakaran
In the second half of twentieth century, a new wave of nationalisms rocked world politics. In many parts of the world, ethno-national groups emerged in independent states and demanded changes in existing economic, social and political relations. They demanded more power to existing arrangements, autonomous or federal set ups, and even independent statehood. The large number of such mobilizations makes this one of the important political questions of our times. These national movements generally perceived as a political, economic and security challenge resulted in violent conflicts between alienated national groups and states. In many other instances national assertions led to the realignment of power distribution within states and this often transformed states from centralized and unitary political entities into decentralized, plural, more representative and more democratic ones.
One peculiarity of ethno-national assertions is that these conflicts generally do not easily yield to negotiated settlements. Such conflicts often prolong for decades and severely hurt both parties. In the context of these developments this paper tries to trace out major factors that stand in the way of a negotiated settlement between the state authorities and the asserting ethnic groups. These include both conceptual and practical issues. In the conceptual part the paper discusses the influence of idea of the nation-state, i.e. a state that represents a single nation, in moulding the views of states and ethno-national groups in the conflict. Generally states that engaged in the creation of a national community from its heterogeneous population regarded the assertions of ethnic groups as an anti-thesis to its goal and was not much amiable to negotiated settlements. Secondly, the mobilizations of ethno-national rights were generally regarded as a security and law and order problem. In other words, rather than perceiving these as an issue of a discontented national group and looking for protection and institutional recognition of their culture and realignment power relations in the state, these assertions were seen as security threat and confronted with superior military strength of the state. While nationalism, democracy and equality influenced the state formation; a natural implication was its influence over national assertions by the unrepresented or discriminated sections within the state. These influences on opposing parties and totally different perceptions of the problem often reduced the areas of convergence that constrained the possibilities of a negotiated settlement of ethno- nationalism. Another factor that hardened positions of both states and ethno-national groups is the interpretation of the principles of the right to self-determination.
Apart from conceptual issues there have been some practical issues that constrained the negotiation process and its positive outcome. Next part of the paper is a discussion of these factors. This includes matters related to the state as weak state structure, weak mediating structures, exploitation, marginalisation and ethnic fear, trust or commitment problem, and the legal and military asymmetry. Secondly, societal factors like the underdeveloped democracy, absence of civil society groups, and history of troubled relations are discussed. The following issues related to ethnic groups like the absence of unified leadership, weak elites, self-interest of the leaders etc., are mentioned in the next part. Finally, aspects like the external support, chain/demonstration effect or contagion and weak mediating capabilities of the international actors are discussed.
Last part of the paper makes an evaluation of possible implications of successful negotiation to the Indian state. Peaceful settlement of such conflicts will make great impact in India’s political and economic life and will substantially improve its international standing. Successful settlements of the conflicts also assist in addressing the issues of alienation, and militarisation of warring societies. India’s relations with its neighbors often come under the shadow of spill over effect of ethno-national conflicts. A peaceful resolution of Kashmir and other such problems would contribute to peaceful South Asia and a stronger regional organization. Finally the paper discusses about the demonstration effect of the negotiated settlement. It may inspire other states and ethno-national groups to think seriously about mechanisms for the amicable resolution of their conflict.
RREALIST ORIENTATIONS IN INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY :
AN ANALYSIS OF INDO-US RELATIONS.
Dr.Josukutty C.A.
Lecturer
Govt.Victoria College Palakkad
Introduction
From the high normative pedestal of idealism of the cold war days, India’s foreign policy has been steadily moving towards power political games and equations in international relations. The triumph of liberal democracy and the end of cold war have ushered in a new political and economic order at home and abroad that forced India, among other things, to redefine the ideological mode of its foreign policy. India which was so proud of its non-alignment and anti-imperialism is now busy singing hosanna to American unilaterism and imperialist designs. The basic assumption of study is that idealism which was the hallmark of India’s foreign policy is being replaced by realism. This is particularly true in India’s relationship with the U.S. especially in the backdrop of the Indo-US nuclear deal. The nuclear deal is the result of an obsession to build a strategic partnership with the US and the desire to become a global power. It is an unprincipled attempt to bury the hitherto idealist ethos of India’s foreign policy, particularly, its stand on the universal nuclear non-proliferation. India believes that through the ‘nuclear deal door’ it could entre the corridors of the ‘political west’ and derive manifold advantages in the unfolding power political games. It is an ambitious project towards power maximisation in international politics. Power political ambitions have become part and parcel of India’s foreign policy objectives. An attempt is made to examine the growing Indo-US relations with special reference to the Nuclear Deal within the idealist and realist theories in international relations.
Idealist Framework
The domestic and international circumstances in which India became free suited the adoption of a foreign policy based on idealism. Idealism emphasizes international law, morality, international organisations, rather than power alone, as a key influence on international events. Idealist believe that human nature is altruistic. With good habits, education and appropriate international structures human nature can become the basis of peaceful and cooperative international relations. Idealist see the international system as the one based on a community of states with the potential to work together to overcome mutual problems.
In conformity with traditional Indian values that stands for peace, tolerance, non-violence, peaceful accommodation, equation of ends and means, universal brotherhood and secularism and self-government, the basic principles of India’s foreign policy (till the 1990s) such as opposition to imperialism, colonialism, racialism, Asianism, liberal internationalism, principles of peaceful co-existence, universal disarmament, promotion of international peace and security, support to the UN, demand for a new international economic order and above all non-alignment were the practical manifestation of idealism in operation.
Realism
Realism or political realism is a school of thought that explains international relations in terms of power. The realist treat political power as separate from, and predominant over, morality, ideology and other social and economic aspects of life. The realist see the states with different religious or ideologies or economic systems as quite similar in their actions with regard to national power. Hans J. Morgentheu, the foremost advocate of realism in international politics says that international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aim of international politics, power is always the immediate the aim. According to Robert Gilpins, a prominent neo-realist, states engage in cost-benefit calculations about alternative courses of action available to them. In Gilpins formulation, a state will attempt to change the international system until the marginal costs of additional change become equal to or exceed the marginal benefits. The bedrock foundation of the realist ontology of international politics is the image of states perpetually struggling for security and power maximisation. They regard war-fighting ability to be the essence of state power and they believe that force is the ultimate ratio of international politics.
Shift Towards Realism
India’s foreign policy that trod through the idealist path embraced the realist option with a sudden twist in the 1990s. From a harbinger of peace and universal brotherhood in international relations, India began to analyse the world in terms or clash of interest and the pursuit of power by individual states. The philosophical premises of India’s foreign policy moved slowly but radically towards the realist canopy. The shift towards the realist path was initiated by Rajiv Gandhi in the late 1980s. Narsimha Rao brought about substantial changes in the foreign policy front in the realist line. There after, it was followed by subsequent governments. India’s former National Security Advisor, Brajesh Mishra, summed up the shift in India’s Foreign policy at the 36th Munich Conference on security policy in February 2000,
‘In the post Nehru period, non-alignment became a mantra just as Gandhiji’s non-violent struggle had become the ‘moral path’, the fact that these policies were grounded in strict rationality and real politik was lost sight of . Escapism was often couched as being principled, and I can safely state that neither Gandhi nor Nehru would have appreciated being made into icons to propagate dogma. There is a new India today that is ready to question these shibboleths and take decisions on the basis of national interest.’
With the shift to realism, there was a sudden convergence of interest between India and the US based on certain common interest and values and the ‘estranged democracies’ became ‘natural allies’. India offered unqualified support to the US campaign on various issues that range from fighting terrorism to tsunami rescue operations. Among these collaborative efforts the Defence Framework Agreement and the Nuclear Deal stand out.
The defence deal provided the background and the platform for the launch of the nuclear deal.
The Nuclear Deal: Power Status and Economics.
The Nuclear Deal which became a reality after the joint statements on July 18, 2005 and March 3,2006 between India and the US. As per the agreement the US would recognise India as responsible nuclear weapon state and would ensure uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel for reactors in India. What is writ large on the nuclear deal is India’s ambition to be recognised as nuclear weapon state. The best way to get its nuclear weapons ‘normalised’ is to get it rationalised by the world’s worst nuclear addict-the US. The realists opine that nations try to maximise power through all possible means. India, too through the nuclear deal, wanted to maximise its power position in world politics as a legitimate nuclear weapon state. It began to think that nuclear weapon capability is a ticket to be regarded as one of the worlds leading power. Like great powers India justified the nuclear deal in terms of national interest of energy security. The argument is that India could meet its energy needs through the nuclear deal and this would help India to ensure energy security for a stable 8-10 percent growth in the coming years. It is the economic and business interests that are transforming the hitherto ‘nuclear-unfriendly’ nations into strategic partners. The US is India’s largest trading partner and it represents nearly 10 percent of India’s total trade. The nuclear industry in the US is also stands to gain substantially from the nuclear deal. Both the US and India have their own economic interests in the nuclear deal and it is in the line of the economic diplomacy in the globalized scenario.
The US: a Strategic Partner
After the cold war India was driven by the belief that only by becoming a strategic partner of the world’s sole super power could it achieve its larger strategic objectives: improving its global position and gaining leverage in its relations with other great powers. The nuclear deal provides for a comprehensive strategic partnership with the US. India clearly acknowledges that the United States is today more important than any other country for fulfilling India’s national aspirations and power ambitions. In return, the US wants India to be a strategic partner in its global power political games particularly in Asia. The US strategic calculation is that the partnership with New Delhi would be useful in maintaining a stable balance of power in Asia and in the world in the 21st century. The collaborative efforts ranges from fighting terrorism to spreading democracy across the world. This is nothing but an attempt to dominate the world in power political terms. And India is enamoured by the US promise of making India a ‘great and responsible power’ in world politics.
Security Concerns: Geo-politics in Asia.
India is closeted between two hostile nuclear powers- China and Pakistan with whom it had fought many wars. With many other immediate neighbours also India does not have stable and peaceful relationship. The pertinent point is that both India and the US have their own common security interests to protect and promote in Asia as it is the centre of gravity of power in world politics today. America sees China as a rival. As a key strategic partner, the US wants , India to be converted into a ‘de-facto ally’ in the ongoing project of ‘containment of China’. In return India gets nuclear deterrence against China through the nuclear deal. In realist terms India has already many advantages against Pakistan in Kashmir and nuclear status on account of the close relationship with the US. Most importantly, from the Indian point of view, the US has stopped hyphenating India and Pakistan. Also the Nuclear deal has great significance in fighting terrorism in and outside India as the US is the only country capable of waging a fight against it. As such the nuclear deal has great security implications for India in Asia.
Buried Values
In the words of the Prime Minister of India the country has chosen the path of ‘enlightened self interest’ and a right mix of ‘principles and practices’ in responding to the changed global scenario. The Indo-US nuclear deal is an important step in this direction as it is burial a ground for most of the traditional principles of India’s foreign policy. The first principle to get diluted was India’s stand on universal nuclear no-proliferation. Now India is a party to the discriminatory nuclear order which it opposed vehemently in the past. Similarly, non-alignment is replaced by alignment with the US, third worldism has given way to alliance with the west, in the place of anti-imperialism we find imperialist alliance with the US, support to the UN is replaced with prominence to the US and support for peace, freedom and democracy is replaced by ambition for raw muscle power. This policy shift is very much visible in the anti-Iran vote in the IAEA to the close relationship with Israel.
Undoubtedly, India’s foreign policy is undergoing some fundamental changes towards an entirely different direction from its traditional stance. It is a departure from the basic tenets evolved through the freedom struggle and practiced during the days of cold war. Power maximisation and great role play of the realist school are the driving forces of the new foreign policy initiatives. The Indo-US nuclear deal speaks volumes about this shift to realism. Gone are the days when India spoke for the rights of the colonised and voiceless in the rest of world.
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Valedictory Address
INDIA AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER
Ninan Koshy
A recurring theme of Indian political and intellectual argument in the twentieth century was the desire for India to forge a place on the international stage. After independence in 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru – through the pursuit of what he termed ‘intelligent self-interest’ – managed to transform this ambition into a relatively effective policy of state: in the polarized and unpropitious circumstances of the Cold War, he established an international voice for his country, based not on hard power but rather on a dextrous combination of realpolitik and moral legitimacy.
The Indian ambition of a global role has gained renewed force in recent years, driven by the deep internal changes and national gains, which are remaking the country. An inflationary rhetoric has crept into assessments of India’s future prospects – by 2020, members of the former BJP government had boasted, India would be a ‘superpower’.
In considering the place of India in the new world order, there are two options: one, a place by imperial assignment and two, a place independently sought in a multi-polar world in the shaping of which India has to be pro-active.
What do I mean by a place by imperial assignment? Yes, a place in the world order assigned by the American empire.
“What word but ‘empire’ describes the awesome thing America is becoming?” asks Michael Ignatieff. Richard Falk says, “The USA is by circumstance and design an emergent global empire, the first in the history of the world.”
It was the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government that dismantled India’s independent foreign policy based on non-alignment and took India to the US camp at the very time that the USA was becoming a global empire. The United Progressive Alliance government, which came to power in mid-2004 strengthened the alliance with the USA ensuring that India stood firmly with the Empire.
It is official. It is the policy of the United States to help India become a major world power in the 21st century. This is what Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice conveyed to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during her visit to India – making an exciting turning point to years of hard work to transform the US-India bilateral relationship into a true strategic partnership; so wrote – rather announced - David C. Mulford in an article in the Times of India on March 31, 2005. This was the declaration –official as the Ambassador termed – of assigning a place for India in the new world order.
The first thing that should be said about India-US relations is that it is essentially a military alliance on US terms and primarily for U.S. interests. Mulford’s predecessor Robert J. Blackwill had made the nature of US-India defence relationship clear in an article he wrote in The Hindu on the eve of his departure. The ‘strategic objective’ is to have ‘an Indian military that is capable of operating effectively alongside its American counterparts. The cooperation is for ‘future joint military operations’. All this, Blackwill candidly admits, is in ‘America’s interest’.
The U.S. was not ready to support India’s bid for a permanent membership in a restructured UN Security Council, Condoleeza Rice made clear during her visit to New Delhi in March 2005 and also later in Washington. Washington’s preference was to its own initiatives on global security to that of the UN and it wanted India to align with it rather than the UN. As Siddharath Varadarajan pointed out:
Dr. Rice also dropped a broad hint that the Indian aspiration for a greater role in international affairs would be better served not through reform of the United Nations – and a permanent seat in the Security Council – but through ad-hoc US-led initiatives such as the controversial and short-lived ‘core group’ set by Washington in the wake of last year’s tsunami
The ‘core group’, into which New Delhi enthusiastically jumped, was actually a Pentagon plan to assess the geo-strategic implications of tsunami and to gain access for the U.S. military to areas where it was otherwise not permitted. The plan was given up because of sharp criticism from European countries like France and the United Nations.
The message was clear: India’s relations with countries, which were ‘against the U.S.’ were subject to approval by Washington; India’s role in the world was to be defined by America –not by India, and not in the framework of the UN. While making customary noises on an independent foreign policy for domestic consumption, India’s policy makers seem to have grasped the meaning of the message. “The current assumption is that India’s ambitions will mesh in with U.S. objectives” (emphasis added), Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran said at a dialogue on Indo-US relations the day after the talks with Secretary Rice.
Just before coming to New Delhi, in a speech in Tokyo Condoleeza Rice equated US-India relationship with US-Korea relationship and US-Japan relationship conceding that they were all part of Washington’s strategy regarding China.
Ambassador Mulford in the article mentioned earlier argued that:
The US and India are poised for a partnership that will be crucial in shaping the international order in the 21st century. Secretary Rice shared with the Indian interlocutors the President’s vision that United States and India must broaden cooperation to help achieve our shared objective- making India the global power that it can and should be. We must match the rhetoric of our negotiations with a programme to realize them.
A State Department briefing around the time elaborated the announcement by saying that Washington understood “fully the implications, including military implications, of that statement”. The message was that India is not a great power yet, but it has the potential to emerge as one by finding its place in the empire.
On March 17, 2005, the Pentagon released a new National Defence Strategy of the United States of America. It strongly suggested Washington’s declining interest and even possible rejection of its traditional alliances, multilateral institutions and even international law. It makes it clear that the freedom of action of the American military will be across the globe.
The new Strategy redefined defence cooperation with the partners of USA, including India. It says the security cooperation programme for strengthening alliances and partnerships works by:
-Identifying areas where our common interests would be served better by partners playing leading roles,
-Encouraging partners to increase their capacity and willingness to operate in coalition with our forces,
-Seeking authorities to facilitate cooperation with partner militaries and ministries of defence,
-Spurring the military transformation of key allies through development of a common security assessment and joint combined and training and education, combined concept development and experimentation, information sharing and combined command and control.
India is to be given necessary military assistance to become a global power within the framework of this new imperialist defence strategy, the U.S. State Department clarified.
During Defence Minister Pranab Mukherji’s visit to Washington he and his counterpart Rumsfield signed “The Framework Agreement on Defence Cooperation” for the next ten years. The Agreement said that the two countries were entering “a new era and transforming the relationship to reflect the common principle and shared national interests”. It stressed that the defence relationship would support and be part of the larger bilateral strategic partnership conducting joint exercises and exchanges and collaborating in multinational operations where it is in their common interests.
The Framework Agreement is by far the most important pact signed between India and the USA. The military alliance of India with the US had reached ‘hitherto unimaginable and unprecedented levels of cooperation” to use the phraseology of the Agreement. It was an Agreement, which showed that India accepted all conditions attached to America’s “offer” to assist India to become “a great world order”. It goes far beyond defence matters. Some of the provisions clearly compromises in foreign policy. These clauses include the agreement to collaborate in “multinational operations” – a euphemism for imperialist wars- “expand collaboration relating to missile defence” which means abjuring India’s strategic autonomy and “building worldwide capacity to conduct successful peacekeeping operations”, apparently outside the UN framework. It has been clearly stated that all these will be under US command.
The direct connection between this defence agreement and the joint statement made by the Indian Prime Minister and the American President on “nuclear cooperation’ just 17 days later in Washington has to be underlined.
“A responsible state with advanced nuclear technology”, that is how President Bush described India in welcoming it to the hallowed nuclear club presided over by the United States. After September 11, 2001 when India became one of the first countries to offer whole-hearted support to the War on Terror and its military and political objectives, all nuclear-related sanctions were lifted and the U.S. began treating India, without officially naming it ‘a responsible nuclear weapon state’.
USA’s nuclear deal with the USA has to be seen as another strong signal that Washington aims to build up India as a counterbalance to China. “The crux of the announcement is what it tells us of the U.s. grand strategy, and behind whatever else is going on here, the US is preparing a grand conflict with China and constituting an anti-China coalition. In that scenario India is even more valuable as a nuclear power, rather than as a non-nuclear country,” wrote Joseph Cincione of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Project of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
The “acceptance speech” by Manmohan Singh for the U.S. offer to assist India to become a great world power was made at the banquet given by President Bush in his honour.
Mr. President, India and America are great democracies. We cherish the openness of our societies and economies. We value our pluralism, our diversity and freedom. These shared values that bring us together must be more visible, not only in how we deal with each other, but also in our approach to the world.
Let us see how the Indian Prime Minister intends to do it:
We must strengthen democratic capacities jointly. We must oppose the evil of terrorism together. To meet such challenges we must be together in the same page. We must speak the same language and display the same resolve.
When the Prime Minister of India says that India and USA ‘must speak the same language’ and ‘display the same resolve’ ‘to meet such challenges’ it raises a number of questions. What is the language of Washington and what constitutes its ‘resolve’? The language of Washington is the language of military power. It is the language of defiance of international laws. It is a language that has redefined democracy, freedom, war and peace. It is the language of a President who has openly claimed that he is a War President and that “Pentagon is the biggest force for freedom in the world.” The resolve of the Bush administration is to see America’s unsurpassed military power to pursue the goal of global domination.
Manmohan Singh was clearly accepting the place for India assigned by the Empire.
What it meant for India’s foreign policy was soon evident in India’s vote against Iran in the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Hindu wrote editorially:
The decision to vote adversarially against Iran at the crucial meeting of the Board of Governors of the IAEA is evidence of Manmohan Singh Government’s shameful willingness to abandon the independence of foreign policy for the sake of strengthening its ‘strategic partnership’ with the United States. Made in stealth without any broad-based discussion with the Government or with allies and national parties the top level decision conflicts with proclaimed Indian policy.
In a public speech at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, at end of February, Stephen J. Rademaker, a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Non-Proliferation and International Security claimed that the U.S. “coerced” India into voting against Iran at recent IAEA meetings. Neither India nor USA has denied it.
At a time when India seems to repose great faith in the Empire, discussion has begun about its decline. Miscalculated policies of the US administration in West Asia are quickly depleting America’s ability to contain its once unchallenged global position. A speech in early April 2006 by US Republican Congressman and Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, Henry Hyde became the focal point of discussion. He said, “Our power has the great liability of rendering our theories about the world immune from failure. But by becoming deaf to easily discerned warning signs, we may ignore long-term costs result from our actions and dismiss reverses that should lead to a re-examination of our goals and means.” Hyde also takes issue with the idea that the US can export democracy around the world as deeply misguided and potentially dangerous.
In his poignant analysis - decoding Hyde’s deliberately implicit thought – Martin Jacques argued in an article in The Guardian, “The Bush administration stands guilty of an extraordinary act of imperial overreach which has left the US more internationally isolated than ever before, seriously stretched financially, and guilty of neglect in east Asia and elsewhere.”
Ironically the invasion of Iraq with its “thousands of tactical mistakes” – as admitted by Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice – was meant to solidify and ensure the US’s post-Cold War global domination. According to Jacques, as inferred from Hyde’s notable speech “It may well prove to be a harbinger of its decline.”.
A direct challenge to the Empire came from Russian President Vladimir Putin in his Munich speech early in February this year. He accused the US of “provoking a nuclear arms race by developing ballistic missile defence, undermining international institutions, making the Middle East more unstable through its clumsy handling of the Iraq war and trying to divide modern Europe”.
The world, Putin said, is now unipolar. “One single centre of power. One centre of force. One single centre of decision-making. This is the world of one master. One sovereign.” He accused U.S. of unilateral and illegitimate military actions creating more instability and danger.
In his inaugural speech at the Arab League Summit in Riyadh at end of March, the Saudi King termed the presence of American troops in Iraq as “illegitimate foreign occupation”. Saudi Arabia, which is now leading the Arab States was openly rejecting US invasion of Iraq, the manifestation of imperial domination.
The second option for India is actually stated in the Common Minimum Programme of the UPA government.
The UPA government will pursue an independent foreign policy keeping in mind its past traditions. This policy will seek to promote multi-polarity in world relations and oppose all attempts at unilateralism.
Except for a very few initiatives, the UPA government has not followed an independent foreign policy. On the other hand it can be shown that the policy is subservient to US policies. The US wants it that way, pronouncements by US leaders during and after discussions on the Hyde Act clearly showed.
The CMP says that the UPA government “will oppose all attempts at unilateralism”. In the present world, unilateralism is synonymous with the actions of the United States. The mandate in the CMP is clear: the UPA government should oppose all unilateral actions of the USA. There is little evidence that the UPA government is willing to do so. On the contrary it is willing to endorse practically all unilateral actions of the USA, including those opposed by America’s traditional allies.
There are various attempts today to foster the idea of a multi-polar world. Various regional groups in Europe, Latin America and other parts have begun to challenge the unilateralist agenda of the USA. Among these of particular interest to India should be the declaration of the World Order in the 21st century signed on 1 July 2005 in the Kremlin by the Presidents of Russia and China. This is a significant document unveiling an agenda for a multi-polar world.
All countries of the world must strictly abide by the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity mutual non-aggression, non-interference in the internal affairs of each other, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.
Admitting that the new world order will be ‘a long and thorny process’, Russia and China stated:
The tasks facing mankind can be achieved only under a just and rational world order based on the universally accepted principles and international law. It is necessary to resolve differences and disputes in a peaceful way avoid unilateral action and not to resort to the policy of diktat, the threat or use of force.
In fostering the new world order, the triangular relations among India, Russia and China can play an important role. Last week President Putin and President Hu Jintao in a joint declaration in Kremlin mentioned this. They called for expanding trilateral cooperation with India. “Triangular interaction enhances mutually beneficial economic cooperation among the three nations, strengthen them in favour of coordination in facing new challenges and threats and contribute to the cause of promoting peace and stability in Asia and throughout the world.
The Russian and Chinese leaders noted that the first trilateral summit meeting held on the sidelines of the G 8 meeting held in St.Petersburg in July 2006 gave new impetus to broaden multifaceted interaction among these countries. The joint declaration also hailed the emerging quadrangular cooperation in the Russia-India-China-Brazil format.
There is unfortunately little evidence that New Delhi is willing to take an active role in fostering alternatives to the Empire. India’s foreign policy is neither effective nor imaginative. That it is not independent does not need any special mention.
India has a legitimate claim to be an Asian power. In contrast to the certitudes of the Cold War era, the world order today is in a flux. Some understanding of the concrete nature of the world order can be gleaned by examining the multiple points of disorder that have emerged recently. Among these are the crises caused by the US-led invasions and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, the continuing Israeli occupation of Palestine, last year’s Israeli aggression against Lebanon, the fast-spiralling dispute over Iran’s civilian nuclear programme which could lead to a huge increase in oil prices as well as war, and the nuclear crisis in the North Korean peninsula. There are also other conflicts such as in Sri Lanka.
All these lie in Asia. Developments in all these have direct implications for India’s national security and interests. But India is conspicuously absent in the mechanisms, processes, initiatives dealing with these. What kind of diplomacy is that India has which does not touch any of these vital issues? Or has somebody asked India to keep off, especially West Asia?
What is at stake is not Asian pride or Indian delusions of grandeur, but the sobering fact that the Empire’s approach to each of these is not only not working but is actually increasing the likelihood of conflict and war. India has a vital interest in restraining the exercise of US power in the region.
A decisive moment has come. Negotiations on 123 Agreement regarding India-US Nuclear Cooperation have made little progress. What is evident is that any agreement crafted on the basis of the Hyde Act, passed by the US Congress will undermine the commitments made by the Prime Minister to the Parliament and people of India on this issue.
India should withdraw from negotiations, reposition itself taking into account the challenges to the unipolar world and actively work for a multi-polar world, with an independent policy mandated by the Common Minimum Programme.
INDIA’S SOFT BALANCING WITH GREAT POWERS: ISSUES IN FOCUS
Anil Kumar P[1]
Abstract
One of the defining characteristics of contemporary international political system is the dominance of the United States in the world and its overwhelming lead over all other nations in terms of all the important indices of power. A similar reality is the rise of China and India. Russia may still be decades away from acquiring a global superpower status. But Moscow’s role as a power broker in global energy market is now fully recognized. Russia is the second largest producer of oil and it has 32 percentages of the world’s proven gas reserves which is more than double the second placed Iran. This single factor makes Russia’s unavoidable power position in the international political system. With the demise of Soviet Union, United States emerged to superpower status. It leads to the decline of classical Balance of power system. In this context a paradigm shift was occurred in India’s relations with great powers. Regarding India-US Relations, it has moved from ‘estrangement’ to ‘engagement’. According to Venu Rajamony and John Graver India-China relations are on a definite path of improvement and their trade relations are bettering day by day. Now India is expanding business and defense co-operation with Russia. But these great powers –i.e. US, Russia and China are concerned they have some strategic interest in dealing with India and many of their interests are conflicting. In this paper what I am trying to presenting is India vis-à-vis great powers are concerned a Soft Balancing is working and which is making benefit to India in several aspects. Here it is analyzing through three cases. (i) India-US Nuclear Deal (ii) increasing trade and strategic partnership between India and China (iii) Putin’s recent visit to India and the results.
T.V. Paul, Professor of International Relations at Mc Gill University Canada provides a concise definition of this basic concept. According to him – “Soft Balancing involves tacit balancing short of formal alliances. It occurs when states generally develop entents or limited security understandings with one another to balance a potentially threatening state or a rising power. Soft Balancing is often based on a limited arms build up, ad hoc co-operative exercises or collaboration in regional or international institutions; these policies may be converted to open, hard balancing strategies if and when security competition becomes intense and the powerful state becomes threatening. Here in India vis-à-vis great powers one can see the emergence of a Soft Balance of power system. A Soft Balance of power system involving four countries can be envisaged as one in which each country tries to be the balancer, promoting its own interest by building relations with other three countries, even as it engages in selective collaboration with one or the other on an issue by issue basis. In such a system, none of the countries would enter into any formal alliances with others. Each country tries to expand relations with the other three countries on the basis of shared interests. At the same time, where interests converge and two or three countries find themselves on the same side, they do not hesitate to work together to advance their common interest vis-à-vis the other
India vis-à-vis great powers are concerned; a paradigm shift was occurred in its relationship. India’s strategic relationship with US, Russia and China is progressing parallelly. India-US Nuclear Deal, Strengthening bilateral trade and strategic ties between India and China and the deepening defense, business and energy co-operation between India and Russia supporting this argument. But there were many conflicting interests and problems. But India is interested in ‘Soft Balancing’ and that is making benefit to India. Based on the evolving international situation and the state of bilateral relations between India and great powers, the system can change from a “soft” system to a “hard” system of formal alliances.
Emerging Trends in the Indo-Iranian Relations
(Abstract)
Dr.K.M.Sajad Ibrahim
Lecturer, Department of Political Science
University of Kerala
India’s desire to enter into relations with global power has brought about significant changes in its foreign policy objectives. In the post-cold war period India has been under the dilemma of articulating its position on major global issues. While entering into dialogues with the United States for promoting the nuclear programmes, the Indian decision makers have lost sight of protecting India’s age-old foreign policy goals. Now the Indian leaders have to depend on the US terms and conditions to finalise its relations with all other countries in the world. Iran was the first victim of this unprecedented tendency of Indian foreign policy direction.
Over the last six decades, the relations between India and Iran have undergone varying degrees. In fact, ‘Pakistan factor’ had been considered as the most important stumbling bloc in between India and Iran for a long period. In the post-Islamic revolution period, ‘secular factor’ minimised the relation between India and Iran. However, both the sides realised the significance of maintaining good relations for mutual benefit. Energy cooperation was one of the major areas which found much headway during this period. India’s desire to resolve its energy crisis provided an opportunity in the furtherance of its relation with Iran. Moreover, the value of such a friendship promoted the interest of the Indian labour force in the Gulf region, as India was looking for a close ally from the Islamic world. It was during this period India’s attention was diverted to explore close ties with the US, the arch enemy of Iran, to promote nuclear energy cooperation. Hence the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal impaired the Indo-Iranian friendship. At present India has no hesitancy of giving up its relationship with Iran since the close ties with the US and Israel far outweigh those it can get from its friendship with Iran. So this factor would be the crucial determinant of India’s future relations with Iran.
· Lecturer and Head, Department of Politics, Government College Madappally, Vadakara 2, Kozhikkode. Email: bijubl@gmail.com
§ Researcher, Centre for IPR Studies, School of Legal Studies, Cochin University of Science and Technology. Cochin-22 E-mail: legaloracle@gmail.com
[1] Lecturer in Political Science, IDE, University of Kerala, Thiruvananthapuram 
